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The trial is over, the jury-has reached a verdict and the accused is
guilty of the crime with which he was charged. Now he stands at the bar
of justice, a prisoner, and the judgment of the law is-to be pronounced. But,
before the court decrees the inexorable legal consequences which necessarily
follow the finding of guilt, the court formally addresses the prisoner, informs
him of the jury's verdict and directly puts the interrogatory, "Do you know
of any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon you?"
Allocution, sometimes called "the allocutus"' is of such ancientness that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to discov& its historical origin.2 In philology,
as in law, allocution is an address, especially a formal, hortatory, authorita-
tive address. 3 "In Roman antiquity" it was "a formal address by a general-
in-chief or imperator to his soldiers," and, "In the Roman Catholic Church"
it is "a public address by the pope to his clergy or to the church generally.
' 4
In legal parlance, anciently and now, everyone agrees, allocution is the
formal address of the trial court 5 to the prisoner as the prisoner stands at
1. 14 ENG. AND EMP. DIG. § 3445; 24 C. J. S. § 1576; 9 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENG. (2d ed. 1933) § 408 (n).
2. 79 SOL. J. 137 (Pt. 1, 1935).
3. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1940) 70; 1 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY (1914) 180; 3 WORDS & PHRASES (1940) 232. The definitions in
BOUVIER and WoRDs & PHRASES are from State v. Ball, 27 Mo. 324 (1858).
4. 1 CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA 149.
5. ". . . this rule of the common law (allocution) . . . applied to the court
of original jurisdiction which pronounced the sentence, and not to an appellate
court, which, upon review of the proceedings in the trial court, merely affirms the
final judgment-no error having been committed to the prejudice of the accused-
without rendering a new judgment." Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 447, 12
Sup. Ct. 525, 526, 36 L. ed. 218, 223 (1892).
Although at common law ". . . if the record of the conviction be removed into
the king's bench by certiorari, and the prisoner also be removed thither by habeas
corpus, that court may give judgment upon that conviction, but there must be
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United States, has been as to what the court's address must consist of; what
the bar for sentence.' The great difference of opinion, especially in the
official of the court must deliver it; at what stage of the proceedings the
ceremony must be performed; in what criminal proceedings is the ritual
of allocution obligatory; what is the result and effect on the cause when this
ancient ritual is omitted or but imperfectly performed; what response, if
any, may the prisoner make to the court's formal, hortatory address; and
finally, whether allocution is now necessary or serves any useful purpose.'
Although the great commentators on the common law, and especially
the authoritative writers on crimes and criminal procedure, relied on the
same sources and authorities, they were not of one accord in their statements
as to when allocution was required, what it consisted of and who was to
perform the ceremony. Though these writers were few in number their
importance and influence on this subject, as in much else in the criminal
law, cannot be over-emphasized. These great expositors of the common
law, especially of the common law of crimes and criminal procedure, were
Blackstone, Chitty, and Archbold in England (and of these, Chitty's prestige
has always been the greatest in matters pertaining to criminal law) and
Wharton and Bishop in the United States. Their texts and the cases they
cite are invariably referred to as the authoritative pronouncements of the
common law when any problem or question involving allocution arises and
it is largely because of their differences in language and their failure to
interpret and explain the cases they cite that vexing problems, controversies
and questions pertaining to allocution arose at all or continue to be pre-
sented and are so variously approached and decided.
Blackstone does not cite a single case or authority to illustrate or
authenticate what he has to say on the subject of allocution and so it is
possible, as was often the case with him, that he merely stated what was
then the prevailing custom and practice. In any event, in the chapter
what he can, why judgment should not be given against him, and thereupon judg-
ment may be given." 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736, 1st Amer. ed. 1847) 401.
And see Rex v. Royce, 4 Burr. 2073 (1767).
6. 1 CHrT. CR. L. *699-700; 3 WORDS & PHRASES 232.
7. Many of the cases are collected in 113 A. L. R. 821; ANN. CAS. 19160
95; Notes (1880) 36 AM. REP. 97; 15 AM. JUR. § 457, pp. 114-116; 24 C. J. S.
§ 1576. Statutes and cases are referred to in the notes to the Am. L. I. proposed
CODE OF CR. PROCEDURE § 389 (Am. L. I. 1930). No law review notes on the
subject have been found.
[Vol. 9
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entitled "Of Judgment, and it's Consequences," this is all he has to say
on the subject: 8
"... We are now to consider the next stage of criminal prosecu-
tion, after trial and conviction are past, . . . which is that of judg-
ment. For when, upon a capital charge, the jury have brought in
their verdict, guilty, in the presence of the prisoner; he is either im-
mediately, or at a convenient time soon after, asked by the court, if
he has anything to offer why judgment should not be awarded
against him.... But, whenever he appears in person, upon either a
capital or inferior conviction, he may at this period, as well as at his
arraignment, offer any exceptions to the indictment, in arrest or stay
of judgment . . ." (Italics added.)
Blackstone then points out that at this point in the proceedings the
prisoner may urge in arrest of the judgment that he has a pardon or pray the
benefit of clergy. "If all these resources fail, the court must pronounce that
judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime. . ."9 This statement, ap-
parently, is plain enough and there should have been but little difficulty
in applying it. He says: "Upon a capital charge," impliedly at least excluding
convictions of crimes not capital. Blackstone says the prisoner "is asked
by the court" and so there might be some question whether the judge or
the clerk is to address the prisoner. But he does not use language neces-
sarily indicating that it is mandatory that the court address the prisoner, even
in capital cases. The allocution the court delivers is the query "if he has
anything to offer why judgment should not be awarded against him."
Nothing is said as to his being informed of the charge against him and of
the'jury's verdict. Neither is it required that the quaere should say" "why
judgment of death?' should not be pronounced against him. Blackstone
does not say that the omission of this ceremony is grounds for a new trial
or even for a resentencing of the prisoner. What he has to say is with
reference to the effect of any objections urged by the prisoner "And, if the
objections be valid, the whole proceedings shall be set aside; but the party
may be indicted again."'1
Chitty in the chapter "Of the Judgment, and its Incidents" had this
to say, (and it has been most frequently quoted and referred to):
"It is now indispensably necessary, even in clergyable felonies,
that the defendant should be asked by the clerk if he has any thing
8. 4 BL. COMM. *375.
9. 4 BL. COMM. *376.
10. 4 BL. COMM., loc. cit. supra note 8.
3
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to say why judgment of death should not be pronounced on him;
and it is material that this appear upon record to have been done;
and its omission, after judgment in high treason, will be a suf-
ficient ground for the reversal of the attainder. On this occasion, he
may allege any ground in arrest of judgment; or may plead a par-
don, if he has obtained one, for it will still have the same conse-
quences which it would have produced before conviction, the stop-
ping of the attainder. If he has nothing to urge in bar, he frequently
addresses the court in mitigation of his conduct, and desires their in-
tercession with the king or casts himself upon their mercy. After
this nothing more is done, but the proper judge pronounces the sen-
tence."11
The differences between this statement and Blackstone's are readily
apparent. It has now become "indispensably necessary even in clergyable
felonies" that the prisoner be addressed, and that by "the clerk." A part
of the ceremony is that he should be asked "why judgment of death" should
not be pronounced upon him. It is also to be noted that allocution is now
required to be shown upon the record to have been done, not that a new
trial would be granted or the defendant set free in the absence of its having
been done and shown in the record, but its omission "It is now indispensably
necessary.... after judgment in high treason, will be a sufficient ground for
the reversal of the attainder,"12 a point often overlooked by subsequent writers
and judges. Chitty buttressed his text with the citation of Blackstone and
several cases.
At a later day Archbold, without the citation of authority, (although
his American editors in a note refer the reader to Blackstone, Chitty, and
the cases he cited, as well as a few early American cases) describing the
procedure to be followed prior to sentence, said: 13
11. 1 CaIT. CR. L. *700. (Italics supplied). Chitty adds (*701) a rather inter-
esting report of the manner in which judges often addressed the prisoner: "Thejudge usually precedes the judgment by an address to the prisoner, especially if his
crime be capital, in which he states that he has been convicted on satisfactory evi-
dence, and informs him when there is little hope that mercy will be extended to
him. Sometimes also he takes an opportunity of impressing the circumstances of
the prisoner's guilt on the minds of the spectators, and traces out the remote but
important causes which have led him to his unhappy condition. Even in case
of an acquittal, he may often usefully warn the defendant against the circumstances
which might again place him in an equivocal situation, especially if there seems
reasonable ground to suppose him guilty."
12. Id. at *700.
13. 1 ARcH., CR. PROC. (8th ed. 1877) 577. The definitions of allocution in
Wharton's Law Lexicon and the CYCLOPEDIc LAW DICTIONARY are from this text.
[Vol. 9
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"In capital cases, also, whether sentence is to be passed, or
only recorded, the clerk of arraigns at the assizes asks the prisoner:
'A. B., have you anything to say why sentence of death should not
be passed (or recorded) against you;' upon which the prisoner may
move in arrest of judgment, if that have not already been done, or
he may address any other observations to the judge which he may
think proper. In other cases, when sentence is about to be passed,
the defendant may address the court in mitigation of punishment,
as well as in arrest of judgment, whether he was tried and convicted
or pleaded guilty. .
Wharton, throughout the many editions of his treatise on criminal
procedure, stated that in earlier times the rule with respect to allocution
was as follows:1
4
"At common law, in all capital felonies, the practice has been
for the clerk, before sentence is pronounced, to ask the defendant
if he has anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced;
and it is essential that it should appear on record that this was
done."
Bishop, in the first edition of his commentaries on Criminal Procedure,15
contented himself with quoting Chitty, verbatim, for the formalities to be
observed prior to sentence. In subsequent editions his text was modified
to reflect the divergent views of the various American jurisdictions. 6
Preliminary to a consideration of the cases from which the common
law rules of allocution emanated certain other features of the common law
of crimes and criminal procedure should be noted. The common law pun-
ishment for all felonies except petty larceny and mayhem was death.17
Though there were said to be degrees of judgments in treason, they in-
variably resulted in the same punishment-death-if and when the sentence
was carried out. The judgments in case of treason were ". . . the solemn and
severe judgment, and the less.'":, The common law did not stop with pun-
ishing the felon or the traitor; but his ancestors, his immediate family, and
14. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING (9th ed. 1889) § 906; see
3 WHAR. CR. PROC. (10th ed. 1918) § 1845.
15. 1 BISHOP, CR. PROC. (1866) §§ 865-866.
16. 2 BISHOP, NEW CR. PROC. (2d ed. 1896 and 1913) § 1293.
17. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG. (1883) 487.
18. 1 HALE, P. C. 351 (1680, 1st Amer. ed. 1847). "The less solemn judgment
is only to be drawn and hanged" says the great Lord Chief-Justice of the King's
Bench. On the other hand, a woman convicted of treason in those days was never
subjected to the humiliation of being hanged or beheaded but the sentence was that
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his posterity suffered the direst of consequences, as well. When the defend-
ant was convicted of a felony or treason, he not only suffered the penalty
of death but also "immediately, by operation of law," he was "placed in a
state of attainder,"'19 which meant that he was "regarded as dead in law"?
even before he was executed. The consequences of attainder were that the
defendant could not be a witness, he could not maintain an action, he could
not perform any legal function and of greater immediate concern to his
family was the fact that he could not make a will or otherwise dispose of his
property.20 In fact, the offender's property, both real and personal, was
forfeited to the crown and, as a further safeguard against possible claims
by his posterity, "the blood of the offender is corrupted."'2 "His bloud is so,
stained and corrupted,.. . his children cannot be heires to him, or any other
ancestor" and if he were noble or gentle before, he and his posterity became
ignoble by reason of the incidence of corruption of blood, says Coke.22
Of necessity some palliatives to these ,severe judgments and their con-
sequences had to develop or be invented. One of these was that a large
number of people, though guilty, were exempted from these extreme penal-
ties; those in a position to claim benefit of clergy, which in the beginning
applied to the clergy only, then to anyone who could read, and finally to,
everyone.23 Since the crown was the prosecutor and the beneficiary of the
forfeitures, the crown in turn could intervene and remit either the punish-
ment, the fine or the forfeiture,2 4 providing the forfeiture was to the monarch
personally, otherwise only Parliament could forgive a forfeiture or reverse an-
attainder.25 , Such pardons were often granted as a matter of grace and fre-
quently they were purchased.2 6 Then, of course, if the person about to be'
sentenced was not in fact the person tried and convicted but was, in fact,.
someone else, that was a valid reason for not inflicting the penalties of the
19. 1 CHIT. CR. L. *723; see 1 ENCYCL. OF THE LAws OF ENG. 616.
20. Id. at *725; see 2 Co. LiTr. *390 b.
21. Id. at *739, 740; see 1 STEPHEN, HIST. OF THE CR. L. OF ENG. 487; 1 HALE,,
P. C. 239.
22. 1 Co. LITT. *391 b; see 1 CHIT. CR. L. *740; HAWKINS, TREATISE OF P.C.
(7th ed. 1795) 477 (c. 49 § 1).
23. 1 STEPHEN, HIST. OF THE CR. L. OF ENG. (1883) 487. Benefit of clergy
was an immunity claimed by the church and conferred by the monarch from scrip-
tural authority, "touch not mine anointed, and do my prophets no harm." 1 CHIT.
CR. L. *668. As to benefit of clergy, especially in United States, see C. J. § 3067.
24. 1 CHIT. CR. L. *762.
25. Ibid.
26. 3 STEPHEN, HIsT OF CR. L. OF ENG. 38-40.
[Vol. 91
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common law upon him. 27 The death gentence of a pregnant woman was re-
prieved until she was delivered of her child.28 And insanity of the prisoner
after conviction was always a ground for a reprieve. 29
"On this occasion . . ." (when the prisoner was asked why judgment
should not be pronounced upon him; that is, when the ceremony of allocu-
tion was performed) he plead his benefit of clergy, that he had obtained
a pardon, identity of person, pregnancy or ". . . any ground in arrest of
judgment ... 3o If allocution was not granted, if the query was not put to
the prisoner and he was not given an opportunity to advance any of these
matters, he was not given another trial nor was his sentence necessarily set
aside, but ".... its omission, after judgment in high treason, will be a sufficient
ground for the reversal of the attainder."3'
The four cases cited by Chitty (and in almost every text and opinion
since his time), and upon which the whole doctrine of allocution is based,
are an Anonymous case,3" Rex & Regina v. Geary,33 The King v. Speke,34
and Rex v. Royce.35
The following is Salkeld's complete report of the Geary case: "Geary
was attainted of high treason on an indictment to which he pleaded guilty.
Upon a writ of error brought to reverse this attainder (italics added), the
exception taken was, that it did not appear he was asked what he had to
say why judgment should not be given against him; and all the precedents
are with an allocutus quid, or si quid pro se dicere habeat, etc. Vide Plowden,
387. Co. Ent. 532; Rast. 455. And the Court held the exception good, for
he might have matter to move in arrest of judgment, or a pardon; and the
attainder was reversed."386 Showers, who argued the case, reports it thus
(spelling modernized): "Error to reverse an attainder of treason . . . for
27. 1 CHIT. CR. L. *698; 2 HALE, P. C. 401
28. 4 BL. COMM. *394-395: Apparently the respite applied to the first preg-
nancy only. If she were found to be with child after the delivery for which her
sentence was respited, no further reprieves were granted. Anon., B. N. C. 48 (1536
K.B.).
29. 1 CHIT. CR. L. *761.
30. Id. at *700; 4 BL. COMM. *376-377.
31. Id. at *700.
32. 3 Mod. 265 (K. and Q. B. 1682-1690).
33. 2 Salk. 630 (K. B. 1689-1712).
34. 3 Salk. (K. B. 1689-1712).
35. 4 Burr. 2073, 2086 (K. B. 1767).
36. This business of attainder had some interesting sidelights and limitations.
In the same volume with the Geary case is Corbet v. Tichborn, 2 Salk. 576 (K. B.
1689-1712), and the report of the case is this: "Ejectment, and trial at bar; the
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levying war... with Monmouth. . . Upon argument I urged these errors
... Fourthly, There is no allocutus before judgment; and all the precedents
are so; for the law requires that of necessity; for he might have a pardon
to plead, or he might move in arrest of judgment.... All held the last to be
a fatal exception. '37
Note in the Anonymous case that the prisoner had already been ex-
ecuted. All that is contained in the report of the case with reference to allo-
cution is this (spelling modernized): "A Gentleman was convicted upon his
own confession for high treason in the rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth,
and executed. It was moved that his attainder might be reversed; the Judges
were attended with Books, and the exceptions taken were, viz .... Thirdly,
Because after the confession the judgment followed, and it does not appear
that the party was asked what he had to say why sentence of death shall not
pass upon him; for possibly he might have pleaded a pardon. For these
reasons the attainder was reversed." (Italics supplied.)
In King v. Speke all that Salkeld reports with respect to allocution is
this (italics supplied): "Writ of error to reverse an attainder of high trea-
son, the error assigned was, that upon oyer of the indictment, the defendant
Speke confessed it, and thereupon judgment was given, but without de-
manding of him, what he had to say for himself, why judgment should not
be given, and per Curiam, this is erroneous, for it is a necessary question,
because he may have a pardon to plead, or may move in arrest of judgment,
for which reason tiw attainder was reversed."3
In Rex v. Royce the defendant had been convicted of the capital felony
of pulling down and demolishing a dwelling-house. 39 The case merely illus-
first, second, etc. sons in tail, remainder to the right heirs of J. S. The said J. S.
commits treason, and then has a son, and then is attainted; and the Court held,
that whether the son was born before or after the attainder, the contingent remain-
der to him was not discharged by the vesting in the Crown during the life of J. S.,
because of the wife's estate, which is sufficient to support it."
37. Showers also raised the interesting and rather quaint point "Upon argu-
ment I urged these errors. . . that though the indictments be in Latin, yet they
are not to be read to the prisoner but in English; for it is the matter, and not the
form they must answer-to." (italics, the author's) King v. Geary, 1 Show. 127 (K. B.
1678-1695).
38. Curiously enough the last paragraph of the report states that the defend-
ant had been acquitted. "The defendant was indicted for high treason in raising
a rebellion in Carolina in America, and tried at bar in Westminster-hall and acquit-
ted; and it was held, that the trial was good by virtue of the statute 25 H. S. cap.
2 . . ."
39. The principal question argued before the King's Bench was whether the
defendant was guilty as a principal in the second degree, if so, by statute, he was
without benefit of clergy.
[Vol. 9
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trates what allocution meant to the King's Bench. After the principal argu-
ments had been concluded and adversely ruled, at the request of counsel,
the prisoner was again brought before the bar and the Solicitor General
prayed judgment against him. Counsel then "... mentioned some objections
to the record, in arrest of judgment," but "... The Court were clear there
were no grounds for any of them ... Whereupon-The defendant being first
asked 'What he had to say why judgment should not be pronounced upon
him and sentence awarded against him;' Mr. Justice Yates, the second Judge
of the Court, (after a very proper expostulation with the defendant, to
convince him of the enormity of his crime, and a very serious and pathetic
exhortation to repentence, as he could have but small or no hope of mercy,)
pronounced sentence of death upon him."3 9a
O'Brien and others were convicted of treason in Ireland. On writ of
error to the House of Lords it was urged that the form of the allocution was
defective because it omitted the words "of death."40 The Lord Chief justice
said: "As to the objection to the Allocts, we think it is the proper form. All
that the prisoner in that stage of the proceedings can properly be asked is,
what he has to say why judgment should not be pronounced; and as to the
precedents which go further, we deem the matter beyond the question stated
to be surplusage."4oa In O'Neill v. The Q'Ueen, 41 an Irish wilful murder case,
it was again urged that the allocution was insufficient because it omitted the
words "against him." The Queen's Bench said: "Now we have on the
record the finding of the jury immediately before the allocatus, that they
had found the prisoner guilty of the crime charged against him, and that
thereupon he was asked what he had to say why the court should not proceed
to judgment. Why it is only to read the word judgment with the preceding
words (they form part of the same sentence), and there could not be an
imaginable doubt that this was addressed to him; but, if there was any
necessity for an authority, that case of Reg. v. O'Brien furnishes it."'4a
Except for the above no other English cases involving allocution have
been found. 42 The present status of allocution in English criminal juris-
39a. 4 Burr. 2073, 2084-2086 (K B. 1767) cited supra note 35.
40. O'Brien and MacManus v. The Queen, 2 H. L. C. 465 (H. L. 1849).
40a. Id. at 493.
41. 6 Cox's Cr. Cas. 495 (Q. B. 1854).
41a. Id. at 504.
42. There was a treason case (the trial of Lord Stafford) in the House of
Lords, 7 How. St. Tr. 1217 (H. L. 1680) in which after the Lords were polled the
prisoner was asked, "What can your lordship say for yourself, why judgment of
9
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prudence is perhaps best summarized in a footnote to an American case,
Commonwealtk v. Senauskas,43 which reads: "In a letter dated August 17,
1937, the Master of The Crown Office and Registrar of the Court of Crim-
inal Appeal of England, informed the writer that the question here dis-
cussed (allocution) is invariably asked in England of all prisoners before
sentence in capital cases, but there is no statutory requirement that this
question must be asked. The official expressed his opinion as follows: 'If such
an objection was raised it would be brushed aside by the Court of Criminal
Appeal because manifestly any substantial point which could be put by a
prisoner in the Court of the first instance, could also be put by him on
appeal, but of course I speak under correction.'"
Curiously enough, however, a writer in the Solicitor's Journal44 in 1935
pointed out that the ceremony of allocution was no longer performed in
non-capital felonies and urged, after reviewing the cases and Chitty, that
the practice be resumed, though he conceded that the common law circum-
stances necessitating such procedure no longer existed. 4
ALLOCUTION IN THE UNITED STATES-IN GENERAL
The American jurisdictions are readily divisible into three classes with
respect to their treatment of allocution; (1) those in which there has never
been a case or a statute relating to the subject, and hence no problems con-
cerning it, (2) those in which there is no statute but in which the matter
has been determined and governed by the decided cases, and (3) those in
which there has been an attempt to handle the problem by statute.
death should not be given upon you according to law." The prisoner, personally,
raised certain technical objections, the Lords retired "found of no moment at all"
his objections and sentence was pronounced.
Then there was a capital murder case in the King's Bench, King v. Garside and
Mosley, 2 Ad. & E. 266 (K. B. 1834) in which the prisoners were asked whether
they had any thing to say why execution should not be awarded," and "merely
said that he (they) was (were) not guilty." Certain points were raised and decided
and "The prisoners being asked again what they had to say, why the court should
not award execution against them upon their attainder, answered nothing." (italics
supplied)
43. 327 Pa. 541, 551, 113 A. L. R. 814, 819 (1937).
44. Note, Allocutus (A Point In Criminal Law) (1935) 79 SoL. J. 137-138
(Pt. 1, 1935).
45. The instance causing the article was that of a prisoner who collapsed,
when the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty of larceny, and remained un-
conscious to the end of the proceedings.
[Vol. 9
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In nine states46 there has never been a reported case nor a statute con-
'cerning allocution. In five of these, Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Vermont and Virginia, it is the custom for the trial judge, before imposing
.sentence, to inquire of the prisoner if he has anything further to say why
-sentence should not be passed upon him even though there is neither case
nor statute requiring it. The question is sometimes put in Maine. In
Rhode Island when the circumstances of the case seem to warrant such an
inquiry the court exercises its discretion and propounds the allocutory ques-
tion, especially when there has been a plea of nolo contendere or a plea of
-guilty. The fact of' allocution is seldom made to appear from the record in
,Colorado. On the other hand, the records in Virginia from the earliest times
show allocution in all types of criminal cases,, misdemeanors as well as
felonies. 48
In eighteen states49 and in the laws of the United States"0 there is no
-statute referring to allocution but in those jurisdictions cases concerning
allocution have been presented and the various jurisdictions' policies regard-
ing it have been determined and governed by what was understood to be
,the common law rule on the subject and by whether the rationale of the
,common law was yet thought applicable and served any useful purpose.
Twenty-one states5l and the American Law Institute's proposed Code
46. Colo., Del., Me., Minn., N. H., R. I., Vt., Va. and W. Va. The attorney
.generals of these states very graciously supplied full information as to the practice
in their jurisdictions. The letters from Colo., Me., Minn., N. H., R. I., Vt. and
Va. were particularly helpful.
47. There seems to be no practice or precedent on the subject in Del. and
W. Va.
48. Because the record of the address in Virginia has been the same for solong ("it being demanded of the defendant, if anything for himself he had or knew
to say why the court should not now proceed to pronounce judgment against him
.according to law"). Attorney General Staples thinks it was taken from some oldform book no longer extant. It may be an adaptation of the record printed as an
appendix to 4 BL. COMM. *355-358 "And upon this it is forthwith demanded of the
said Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth anything to say, wherefore the said justices
here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment and
-execution against him."
49. Ala., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill., La., Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., N. J., N. M.,
N. C., Ore., Pa., S. C., Tenn. and Wis.
50. The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
this sentence which will be noted later: "Before imposing sentence the court shall
afford the defendant the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to
.present any relevant information in mitigation of punishment." Rule 30a.
51. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Idaho, Ind., Ia., Kan., Ky., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
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of Criminal Procedure52 have statutes specifically covering the subject of
allocution.
Strangely enough, the greater number of cases involving allocution have
arisen in a jurisdiction without a statute-Alabama, and one in which there
is a statute-Missouri. 53
JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH THERE HAVE BEEN CASES AND IN WHICH
THERE ARE No STATUTES
A. Jurisdictions Requiring Allocution.
In the jurisdictions in which there are no statutes and in which there
have been cases the courts have divided into two groups: (1) those requir-
ing allocution and (2) those in which allocution is thought to be a useless
ceremony, no longer necessary or required. Those in the first group purport
to follow Chitty and the common law, while those in the second group have
decided that the common law reasons for allocution have long since dis-
appeared and there is no further need to continue so vain and inutile a
practice.
Alabama's treatment of allocution is typical of the jurisdictions follow-
ing the view that the common law requires the court, before sentence, to
inquire of the prisoner if he has anything to say why judgment should not
be pronounced upon him. In 1869 two cases arose,54 a non-capital murder
case and an arson case, and it was objected that the allocutory question had
not been propounded. Despite the fact that the question had been before
the court in 1866,1 in a larceny conviction it was stated that "So far as we
know, this question has not, until the present term of this court, been made
in this State." Citing the old. English cases and the New York case of
Safford v. People,55a the Supreme Court of Alabama held that since the
convictions were for felonies the judgments were erroneous because they
failed to show allocution. Because of the court's exceptional attitude in
the next case before it involving allocution, it is well to note that in the
Crim and Perry cases there were errors other than the failure of the record
52. A. L. I. Code of Cr. Proc. §§ 389-397 and commentaries thereto pp. 1094-
1102.
53. There are at least 44 opinions in Missouri criminal cases involving allo-
cution.
54. See Perry v. State, 43 Ala. 21, 23 (1869); Crim v. State, 43 Ala. 53 (1869).
55. Aaron and Ely v. State, 39 Ala. 684, 690 (1866).
55a. See 1 Park Cr. Rep. 474 (N. Y. 1854).
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to show allocution and for those reasons the defendants were granted new
trials. Five years later Mullen appealed a conviction of assault with intent
to murder,5 6 other errors were assigned and overruled but as to allocution
the court said: "But there is one error shown by the record for which the
judgment must be reversed. It does not appear that the defendant was asked
by the court if he had any thing to say why sentence should not be passed
upon him. In felonies . . . this is necessary." This is one of three known
instances of defendants' being granted new trials in criminal cases on the
sole ground that the record did not show allocution. The case is exceptional
for these views and rather astonishing as well in view of the Aaron and Ely
case decided in 1866 and apparently overlooked by the court in the Perry
and Crim cases as well as in the _Mullen case.
Aaron and Ely were convicted of grand larceny and the record in their
case failed to show allocution. The court fully reviewed the English cases,
Chitty, Archbold and Safford v. People and held allocution necessary "In
West. The State. ... in all convictions of felony." The court's arguments
in favor of the requirement were that "It is not a mere form, but is a sub-
stantial riglt, given by the law. If a prisoner has no ground to allege in
arrest of judgment, no pardon to plead, he may address the court in mitiga-
tion of his conduct, desire its intercession with the pardoning power, or cast
himself upon its mercy." (Italics added.) But the record was silent as to
whether there had been allocution and the majority of the 'court ruled that
in the absence of a showing to the contrary it would be presumed that the
question had in fact been asked. This was the view of the -court in another
case,5 7 decided prior to the Mullen case. Also it had been presumed that
the question had been put when the record recited that "In the present case
.... the prisoner 'said nothing . . .'" when sentence was pronounced.58 In
1877 the Alabama court further modified the requirement in Spigner v.
State. 9 In that case the record failed to show allocution but the record
showed that after verdict the defendant had filed two motions, one in arrest
of judgment and one for a new trial. The court pointed out that the purpose
of the requirement was that the prisoner, might have an opportunity after
verdict and prior to sentence "to make any motion which will prevent judg-
ment" and the court added the novel wrinkle, in the absence' of statutory
56. Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43, 47, 6 Am. Rep. 691 (1871).
57. Robin v. State, 40 Ala. 72 (1866).
58. Taylor v. State, 42 Ala. 529 (1868).
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requirement, that the record recital of these two motions ". . . proves that
the usual question must have been in substance propounded" and as a mat-
ter of fact "the prisoner had accorded to him substantially, all the rule was
intended to secure. ' 'Sa In view of this the court said: "It would look like
child's play to remand this cause, when the only effect could be to propound
the question to the-prisoner, receive his answer that he had nothing to
offer, and then pronounce the sentence of the law . . ." and the court
affirmed the judgment without so much as remanding the case for resen-
tencing.
The Supreme Court of Alabama had held that a merely erroneous sen-
tence could be corrected by the trial court6" or by a remanding of the case
for that purpose only 61 and so in 1915 when a record in a felony case ap-
peared62 and there was no recital of allocution the court adopted this view:
"The end and aim of the law in requiring such question to be asked of the
defendant will be fully met, however, by reversing the judgment merely back
to the sentence, leaving the judgment of conviction to stand, and directing
the court to resentence the prisoner, after first asking such question, unless
defendant's answer discloses good reasons why he should not be sentenced."
And that has been the practice and the procedure in Alabama ever since. 3
However, there seems to be some confusion when the record fails to show
allocution and in addition, "there is in the judgment entry no formal ad-
judication of guilt." In two such instances4 the cases were reversed and
remanded for a new trial and apparently for that reason; while in a later
case 65 the court, with an identical record, remanded the case with this sug-
gestion: "If upon a further consideration of the case there should be found
sufficient record evidence to support a judgment nunc pro tunc, a retrial
on the facts would not be necessary."
The view obtains in Alabama, therefore, that the common law requires
allocution in all instances of felony trials and convictions,c6 but it is not
59a. See Ibid.
60. Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502 (1881).
61. Ex Parte Robinson, 183 Ala. 30, 63 So. 177 (1914).
62. Bryant v. State, 13 Ala. App. 206, 68 So. 704 (1915).
63. Frazier v. State, 17 Ala. App. 486, 86 So. 173 (1920); Cheney v. State,
23 Ala. App. 144, 122 So. 301 (1929); Brooks v. State, 234 Ala. 140, 173 So. 869
(1937); Smith v. State, 189 So. 86 (Ala. 1939).
64. Coleman v. State, 20 Ala. App. 120, 121, 101 So. 81 (1924); See McMahan
v. State, 21 Ala. App. 522, 109 So. 553 (1926). 1
65. Oliver v. State, 25 Ala. App. 34, 35, 140 So. 180, 181 (1932).
66. Croker v. State, 47 Ala. 53 (1872); Boynton v. State, 77 Ala. 29 (1884).
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required in misdemeanor cases.67 Alabama has not been confronted with
the question of whether or not allocution is required upon a plea of guilty.
Other than Chitty and the English cases, the early New York decisions,
especially Safford v. People,68 appear to have been most persuasive with the
courts adopting the view that the common law compelled allocution in felony
convictions and for that reason the early New York cases (prior to the
enactment of a statute in 1881) should be interpolated, especially so since
that court sought to examine into and advance reasons for the requirement.
The Safford case was a seduction conviction in which the record failed to
show allocution. Citing the English cases previously noted but paraphrasing
Chitty's text the court held it necessary that the record show allocution.
The court said that most of the English cases involved convictions for trea-
son, "... but the principle is the same; and the reason stated in all the books
is, that the prisoner may have a pardon to plead or he may move in arrest
of judgment; and neither Chitty or Blackstone make any distinction." The
second reason given is that "The practice has its foundation in good sense
and common justice, and the principle certainly applies to all cases of felony
S. ." Despite these views the court rather dubiously thought the omission
from the record might have been an inadvertence and if so the trial court
might amend its record.
Subsequently it was decided that allocution was necessary in capital
cases and while it would not be presumed from a silent record 9 the record
could be corrected to show the fact.70 In 1871 a record in a capital case 7
failed to show allocution and the New York court again reviewed Chitty and
the English cases fully and followed Safford v. People. The effect of the
omission was said to be that "It deprived the defendant of a substantial legal-
right." Because; "It was his right, at this stage, to move in arrest of judg-
ment for any legal defect in the indictment or other proceedings . . ."; or
(and this was a new idea suggested by the court) "to show that the verdict
was vitiated and should be set aside for the misconduct of the jury or for
any other legal reason . . ."; or "to plead a pardon." The court concluded
this phase of its opinion by stating that allocution was an integral part of
67. Bowles v. State, 241 Ala. 142, 1 So. (2d) 665 (1941); Cole v. State, 27
Ala. App. 90, 166 So. 58 (1936); Estes v. State, 18 Ala. App. 606, 93 So. 217 (1922);
Crawford v. State, 16 Ala. App. 68, 75 So. 274 (1917).
68. 1 Park., Cr. R. 474, 476-77 (N. Y. 1854).
69. Graham v. People, 63 Barb. 468 (N. Y. 1872).
70. Graham v. People, 6 Lans. 149 (N. Y. 1871).
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the trial, and "Indeed this may be. . . . essential prerequisite to an adjudica-
tion of the guilt- of the prisoner", a rule of law with which the trial court
could not dispense and "which the wisdom and experience of ages has found
necessary for the protection of the innocent." And the majority of the court
adopted the astonishing view that because of this omission "The judgment
must be reversed and a new trial ordered," and that was the practice in New
York until 1911.72
When the problem of whether allocution was an indispensable require-
ment of the common law was presented to the Supreme Court of Florida in
a capital case73 that court relied on Bishop, Blackstone, the cases cited by
Chitty and the New York cases, but the applicability of the requirement
was considerably modified. That court interpreted the common law authori-
ties as holding the ceremony of allocution indispensably necessary in cases
in which there had been a capital conviction only and not in other felony
convictions.74 The court said the ceremony was material in such cases only
because the prisoner was then informed that sentence was about to be pro-
nounced and that he might then urge any reason why final judgment should
not be entered. The court also pointed out that while the omission of this
tradition ceremony ". . .may be sufficient ground for arresting or setting aside
the judgment or sentence, it does not seem to be good ground for a new
trial," and the cause was remanded with the "verdict standing unimpaired."
(Italics added.) In the next case 75 before the court there had been a motion
for a new trial and the court examined the record and finding no error for
which the judgment should have been arrested said: ".... it does look like
child's play to send the case back for the purpose of asking a question to
which there can be no answer that will change the prisoner's fate" and "... . in
the absence of a meritorious reason (we) are not disposed to do so." De-
spite its prior interpretation of the common law of allocution and as late as
1917,76 in a violation of a local option liquor law case which had to be re-
manded anyway the court added this disconcerting sentence concerning
allocution: "It would be a prudent thing to do in all cases, whether capital
72. See People v. McClure, 148 N. Y. 95, 42 N. E. 523 (1895); People v.
Faber, 199 N. Y. 256, 92 N. E. 674 (1910); cf. People v. Nesce, 201 N. Y. 111, 94
N. E. 655 (1911). In praise of the former cases see Note (1911) 2 J. Crim. L. 170.
73. Keech v. State, 15 Fla. 591 (1876).
74. Hodge v. State, 29 Fla. 500, 10 So. 556 (1892); Blount v. Fla., 30 Fla.
287, 11 So. 547 (1892).
75. Hodge v. State, 29 Fla. 500, 510-11, 10 So. 556, 558 (1892).
76. Thomas v. Fla., 74 Fla. 200, 213, 76 So. 780, 785 (1917).
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or not, because it may happen in any case that some valid reason exists why
sentence should not be pronounced."
In Georgia an abolitionist defendant was sentenced to four years' im-
prisonment for attempting to procure a slave to "carry away" two other
slaves and the record of his conviction failed to show allocution.77 The court
reviewed the common law and decided the ceremony was required in cap-
ital cases only, that it was not material in "minor felonies" unless the de-
fendant had been deprived of an opportunity to move in arrest of judgment
or of some other legal right to which he was entitled. Seven years later, in
1859,78 Sarah, a slave, attempted to poison her master and his family for
which she was sentenced to be executed. The record in her case failed to show
that she had been asked if there was any reason why sentence should not be
pronounced. The Georgia court conceded that the "ancient practice" re-
quired the question to be propounded but pointed out that the rule originated
at a time when prisoners were not allowed the benefit of counsel (a fact
which seems not to have disturbed common law judges and writers in the
slightest); that benefit of clergy was then allowed and that a prisoner at
that stage in the proceedings could plead a pardon. While in Georgia benefit
of clergy had been abolished and a pardon would be available and honored
"even under the gallows." The court observed that its penal code made no
reference to the ceremony but did prescribe with minuteness the procedure
to be observed in the trial of criminal cases, including motions in arrest of
judgment which were invariably filed before sentence. And so the court
added this limitation to the requirement, even in a capital case: "Had it
been made to appear that the prisoner had lost any right by the failure of
the court to observe this ceremony, relief would be extended." (Italics
added.)
In the absence of the record's showing the contrary the Georgia court
assumes the ceremony of allocution was performed, even in a capital case.7 9
In 1919, in a capital case,80 the Georgia court reexamined Sarah's case, as
well as Grady's, and found that the appellant had been defended by a court
appointed lawyer, that motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment had
been filed, that prisoner and counsel were present and made no request to be
heard when sentence was pronounced and therefore adhered to the view
77. Grady v. State, 11 Ga. 253 (1852).
78. Sarah (a slave) v. State, 28 Ga. 576, 584 (1859).
79. Rawlins v. Mitchell, 127 Ga. 24, 55 S. E. 958 (1906).
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that unless it appeared that the appellant had been deprived of some sub-
stantial right by reason of the omission it would "... not require a vain
thing to be done" and affirmed the conviction.
A capital case involving allocution has never been presented to the
Illinois court, but in non-capital felonies the court had failed to find any-
thing the prisoner could possibly say that would stay the pronouncing of
judgment at that period in the proceedings8 and has therefore held it un-
necessary to put the question in such cases although the practice of doing
so obtains and is recommended.8 2 If the record recites that neither the
defendant nor his counsel said anything before judgment was pronounced
it is implied that an opportunity to speak was afforded.
83
In Louisiana allocution is "not sacramental", though customary and
prudent, and therefore its omission in a non-capital felony is not such an
error as vitiates the proceedings in any respect.814 Especially is this true when
it does not appear that the defendant has been deprived of any of his rights,
as when it appears he was present when sentenced and made no objection8"
or was heard on motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment. "These are
the only modes in which cause could be shewn why the sentence should not
be pronounced.""6 Furthermore, when the record implies that the prisoner
was asked the question he cannot complain87 and it is not error for the clerk,
rather than the judge, to put the question.8 8 And though allocution is in-
dispensably necessary in a capital case,8 it is interesting to note the very
novel manner in which the Louisiana court handled the matter in the Ikenor
case. The record failed to show allocution and "The Attorney General was
thereupon directed to ascertain whether that formality had been omitted
81. Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 3 N. E. 521 (1886).
82. Gannon v. People, 127 Ill. 507, 21 N. E. 525, 11 An. St. Rep. 147 (1889);
Harris v. People, 130 Ill. 457, 22 N. E. 826 (1889).
83. Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 3 N. E. 521 (1886) cited supra note 81;
Gillespie v. People, 176 I11. 238, 52 N. E. 250 (1898); Lamb v. People, 219 I1. 399,
76 N. E. 576 (1905).
84. State v. Shields, 33 La. Ann. 991 (1881); see State v. Taylor, 27 La.
Ann. 393, 21 Am. Rep. 561, (1875); State v. Smith, 33 La. Ann. 1414 (1881); State
v. Sims, 117 La. 1036, 42 So. 494 (1906).
85' State v. Bradley, 30 La. Ann. 326 (1878); State v. Avery, Man. Unrep.
Cas. 257 (La. 1880).
86. State v. Cheney, Man. Unrep. Cas. 394, 397 (La. 1878).
87. State v. Fritz, 27 La. Ann. 360 (1875); State v. Huge], 27 La. Ann. 375
(1875); State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 (1875).
88. State v. Ross, 32 La. Ann. 854 (1880).
89. State v. Askins, 33 La. Ann. 1253 (1881); State v. Ikenor, 107 La. 480,
32 So. 74 (1901).
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as a matter of fact or whether the minutes were incomplete." Then the re-
port continues: "Through due proceedings we have been informed that the
question was, in point of fact, propounded to the defendant before sentence.
Defendant and his counsel admitted this fact on being ruled into court to
show cause why the minutes should not be corrected, and consented to the
correction of the minutes."
The Supreme Court of Maryland pointed out that most of the reasons
originally given for requiring allocution were no longer applicable in that
state.soa It was stated that a pardon from the chief executive would be
recognized any time. In Maryland, if sentence was pronounced before ex-
piration of the time permitted for filing motions for a new trial or in arrest
of judgment the sentence and judgment for that reason could be set aside
on motion any time during the term, as was done in the instant case, and
the motions filed and considered. The court then held the omission was not
error ". . . unless it is apparent that the prisoner was or may have been
injured by the omission" and the practice was strongly recommended, es-
pecially in capital cases in which the court exercised some discretion in fixing
the penalty. The court thought, however, if it appeared the prisoner had
been injured, the case would be remanded for resentencing only, after the
prisoner had been heard on what was thought to be a meritorious objection.
When the death penalty was inflicted upon a plea of guiltysb the court dis-
posed of the point that allocution had been omitted by saying "It is settled
that it is not grounds for reversing a sentence in this state."
It is doubtful that Massachusetts and Michigan belong in this class of
cases. There has been but a single case in each state,-both non-capital fel-
onies, but since allocution is the practice they are noted here rather than
with the cases denying the necessity of allocution at all. When it was ob-
jected that the allocutus had been omitted in a false pretense case 9C it was
stated that the common law required it in capital cases only and whether it
was required in Massachusetts was to be determined by its own rules rather
than those of England. The defendant had moved for a new trial and in
arrest of judgment and so it was held the recitals in the record showed all
that was necessary and established either a demand or a waiver of it, the
court observing as to the custom, however: "No such recital on the record
89a. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 383, 91 Atl. 417, 421 (1914).
89b. Duker v. State, 162 Md. 546, 548, 160 At). 279, 280 (1932).
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has been deemed necessary here, nor has such fact usually been stated, except
in capital trials. We do not understand that in felonies not capital any
formal question corresponding to that stated is required to be put to the
defendant upon his conviction by the jury and before sentence. Practically,
full opportunity is to be given for assigning reasons why judgment should
not proceed against him, (motions for new trial and in arrest) and the op-
portunity is secured by the course of proceedings in each case."
In the Michigan case there was a sentence of twenty-five years for mur-
der. ga The court stated that allocution had never been deemed essential
except in capital cases and that in the present case there had been ample
time to move for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. As to the ancient
custom, which if necessary was only ground for resentencing, the court said:
"Whatever good purpose this practice may have served in England when
parties charged with crime were not allowed counsel, it is now a mere idle
ceremony."
The Mississippi court reviewed the cases, Blackstone, Chitty, Archbold
and Bishop as "the highest authorities" and held allocution indispensable in
a capital case.90 "As these forms of records are deeply seated in the founda-
tions of law, and as they conduce to safety and certainty, they surely ought
not to be disregarded when the life of a human being is in question." But
even in a capital case, allocution was assumed when "The record states. ...
'after hearing the defendant' sentence was pronounced." 0' 1 When the court
was asked to require the ceremony in all felony cases the authorities were
again fully reviewed but the court being particularly impressed with the
Missouri case of State v. Bal 91a said, "While concurring in the sentiment
. we are disposed to enforce it in capital cases only." 2
In New Mexico allocution has been handled with some indecision,
though the court was not influenced so much by the common law writers
except Wharton. It is not now required in the instance of a non-capital
felony93 nor upon a plea of guilty'4 even though the defendant was not rep-
resented by counsel. In the first capital case presented 9 the court, in a
89d. People v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 579, 63 N. W. 656, 659 (1895).
90. James v. State, 45 Miss. 572, 579 (1871).
91. Edwards v. State, 47 Miss. 581, 591 (1873).
91a. 27 Mo. 324 (1858).
92. Jones v. State, 51 Miss. 718, 728 (1875).
93. U. S. v. Sena, 15 N. M. 187, 106 Pac. 383 (1909).
94. State v. Jones, 34 N. M. 499, 285 Pac. 501 (1930).
95. Territory v. Webb, 2 N. M. 147, 158 (1881).
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rather confusing manner, pointed out what it considered the benefits, the
shortcomings, and the reasons for requiring or not requiring the ceremony,
as they appeared under its practice, and held it necessary in such cases but
presumed the observance of the requirement from a silent record and af-
firmed the judgment. Quoting from Wharton the court observed, however,
that the occasion of the allocutory address was not an invitation to a de-
fendant to bring forward additional grounds or motions for new trial or in
arrest of judgment but "The object of the address is to give defendant the
opportunity to personally lay before the court statements, which, by the
strict rules of law, could not have been admitted when urged by his counsel
in the due course of legal procedure; but which, when thus informally offered
from man to man, may be used to extenuate guilt and to mitigate punish-
ment." Twenty years later a non-capital murder appeal in which allocution
had been omitted came before the court. 6 The court adhered to the com-
mon law rule that allocution was essential in a capital case and interpreting
Ball v. U. S.,97 stated that "This privilege was deemed to be of such sub-
stantial value to the accused that the judgment would be reversed if the
record did not aflrmatively show that it was accorded to kim." (Italics
added.) Since this defendant had not been sentenced to be executed, how-
ever, the court remanded the cause for a resentencing only. But, as noted
above,98 the court subsequently adopted the view that allocution was not
essential in a non-capital case.
Finally, when a record in a capital case99 came before the court the
appellant relied on Territory v. Herrera and asked the court to abide by its
former statement and grant him a new trial, while the state relied on the
original case of Territory v. Webb and contended that since the omission
did not affirmatively appear from the record but was only presumed from
its silence the appellant was not entitled to a new trial. The court followed
its first opinion and sent the case back for resentence only.
In North Carolina there has been but one appeal involving allocution.
In that case the death penalty was assessed for rape. 100 The court would
not permit the penalty to be inflicted in such cases until the defendant had
been informed of his rights, even though the only effect of the omission
96. Territory v. Herrera, 11 N. M. 129, 143, 66 Pac. 523, 525 (1901).
97. 140 U. S. 118, 11 Sup. Ct. 761, 35 L. ed. 377 (1890).
98. U. S. v. Sena, 15 N. M. 187, 106 Pac. 383 (1909) cited supra note 93.
99. State v. Ybarra, 24 N. M. 413, 420, 174 Pac. 212, 214 (1918).
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would be to arrest the judgment until he was so informed. As to allocution
the court made the rather different observation that: "There is, in capital
trials, much that is formal, and intended only to make them impressive and
solemn; but even these purposes are useful, and such ceremonies ought not
to be neglected. It is, however, not a matter of formality, but of necessity,
that the prisoner should be informed that his case is not closed by the verdict
of the jury against him, and that he may still urge any reason he may have
why he should not suffer death." Since the court 'conceived this to be the
policy of the requirement it was also of the view that: "There is no mere
formula in which the prisoner should be informed of his rights; it is sufficient
that it appears that he was informed that the verdict did not conclude him
from urging anything he might think necessary," and because he had been
heard on motion for a new trial and had had, in the appellate court, the
benefit of everything he could have urged in arrest of judgment it was held
that he had in fact been informed of his rights and had advanced such rea-
sons as he had. Because all the defendant's rights had been protected the
court specifically held there was no error in omitting allocution.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has had but one felony case in which
allocution was omitted.10' The court was of the view that the common law
compelled the ceremony in capital cases only. The court further pointed
out, however, that if compelled in other felonies (following the North Caro-
lina court) a defendant who moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment
was thereby accorded, as a practical matter, all the rights the common law
was intended to secure and such an instance was thought to be, substantially,
a compliance with the rule of the common law.
For the most part there has been nothing unusual about Pennsylvania's
attitude toward allocution, even though one of its earliest decisions0 2 be-
came a leading authority for the view that it was compelled by the common
law in a capital case. 03 The court, in its first case, may have considered the
omission such an error as to warrant a new trial but when the same error
appeared twenty-four years later 04 the court held the ceremony necessary
but remanded the case for allocution so as to give the defendant an oppor-
tunity "It is necessary. ... to plead in bar of the sentence any matter
101. State v. Sally, 41 Ore. 366, 70 Pac. 396 (1902).
102. Hamilton alias Thocker v. Com. 16 Pa. 129 (1851).
103. Com. v. Preston, 188 Pa. 429, 437, 41 Adt. 534, 535 (1898); Com. v.
Tauza, 300 Pa. 375, 150 At. 649 (1930).
104. McCue v. Com., 78 Pa. 185, 191 (1875).
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sufficient to prevent its execution"; for example, a pardon or supervening
insanity. The court did say: "The question and the answer that he hath
nothing to say other than that which he hath before said, or this in sub-
stance, must appear in the record before sentence can be pronounced."
While it is necessary to thus observe the ceremony, in capital cases only, it
is enough that the prisoner was asked "The record shows. . . . if he had any-
thing to say why sentence should not be passed upon him" without saying
and the record showing the words "of death" following the word "sen-
tence."'0 ° In 1925106 with a record silent as to allocution it was observed
the only effect of the omission could be to remit the cause for a resentencing
and because the defendants made no request for an opportunity to make
an explanation, and it appearing that no advantage could have been gained
had they been given the chance, the judgment was affirmed.
The leading case in Pennsylvania at present is Commowealtk v.
Senauskas,10 7 dealing with the problem of whether allocution is required
upon a plea of guilty and there is a sentence of death.
The allocutive question was put in this case but the words "of death"
were omitted and although that was the only omission the court went into
the whole subject exhaustively. The defendant plead guilty on June 2, and
the case was continued to June 10, for the purpose of hearing evidence to
determine the degree of the murder. Evidence was heard and on June 23,
the defendant was sentenced to be executed. On June 27 motions for a new
trial, in arrest and to withdraw the plea of guilty were filed, the defendant
claiming that he had been coerced into pleading guilty and that the judge
had agreed not to inflict the death penalty. The court, while affirming its
view that the common law compelled the allocutive query in a capital case,
pointed out that the common law reasons for the rule no longer obtained.
To illustrate, at common law a defendant had no counsel and no absolute
right to an appeal, and when the prisoner was thus addressed allocutively
he alleged any reason which was ground for arresting the judgment. "Putting
this question to the prisoner gave him his last opportunity to speak to some
one with power to save him from his impending doom." So at common law
it was a serious invasion of his rights, the court said, to deprive him of this
last opportunity to speak. While at the present time even "A sentence of
105. Rizzolo v. Com., 126 Pa. 54, 73, 17 Atl. 520, 521 (1889); see Com. v. Sen-
auskas, 327 Pa. 541, 549, 194 Adt. 646, 649-650 (1937).
106. Com. v. Weiss, 284 Pa. 105, 130 Atl. 403 (1925).
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death. ... has no such irrevocability about it as it had at common law."
The court observed that anything the defendant could have said before
sentence was pronounced could have been said with equal effect by himself
or his counsel in either the trial or appellate court after sentence. "Modern
criminal procedure has thus taken away this rule's raison d'etre" but even
so "careful judges will continue to make in such cases this ancient inquiry
in unequivocal language." But, "Failure to do so will constitute reversible
error only when it is shown that the prisoner has been thereby prejudiced."
(Italics added.) There being no showing of prejudice, Senauskas' sentence
was affirmed.
In South Carolina when the record in a non-capital felony does not
affirmatively disclose that allocution was omitted it is presumed that sentence
was imposed "with the formalities required by law."'"" However, citing
Blackstone, Chitty, Archbold and Bishop, the court found it has always been
the practice and is required in capital cases 09 "And it seems. ... not simply
because it was formal and seemly, but because of legal requirement founded
upon wise consideration"; but even so, its omission is not an error affecting
the whole proceeding so as to require a new trial and the remedy for "The
error. ... should extend only as far as the error extended."
The first criminal appeal involving allocution in the United States courts
was of a misdemeanor"10 and the court summarily disposed of the question
by holding it unnecessary in such cases. The first capital case was presented
to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1891,"' and Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, citing the old English cases, Chitty, Bishop and Wharton,. came to
the conclusion the common law compelled allocution in all capital cases.
The case was remanded for a new trial for other reasons and the court did
not indicate what the consequences of omitting allocution would be. The
following year a habeas corpus case 12 was before the court on demurrer to
the petition and the case was this: Schwab, one of the Haymarket rioters,
was tried and sentenced to be executed on October 6, 1886, by an Illinois
108. State v. Hunter, 82 S. C. 153, 159, 63 S. E. 685, 687 (1908).
109. State v. Trezevant, 20 S. C. 363, 364 (1883); State v. Jefcoat, 20 S. C.
383 (1883).
110. Turner v. U. S., 66 Fed. 287 (C.C.A. 5th, 1895); Turner v. U. S., 66 Fed.
289 (C.C.A. 5th, 1895)."
111. Ball v. U. S., 140 U. S. 118, 11 Sup. Ct. 761, 35 L. ed. 377 (1890), cited
supra note 97.
112. Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 446, 447, 12 Sup. Ct. 525, 526, 36 L.
ed. 218, 219 (1892).
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state court. His conviction was affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois
fixed November 11, 1887, as the date for executing the sentence of the crim-
inal court of Cook County. The day preceding that fixed for the execution
the governor of Illinois commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.
In his habeas corpus petition Schwab alleged that the recital in the judgment
of the Supreme Cour of Illinois that "It is averred. .... 'on this day came
again the said parties' was . . . false and untrue," that neither he nor his
counsel was present when the court imposed the sentence of death and
therefore his confinement was illegal. The court held that the common law
rule requiring allocution applied to the trial court only and not to an ap-
pellate court, because the appellate court only carried out the sentence of
the trial court. But, in discussing the subject the court again collated all
the common law authorities and by way of dictum, obviously, held allocu-
tion essential in all capital cases and, citing Ball v. United States, stated
that "This privilege was deemed of such substantial value to the accused,
that the judgment would be reversed if the record did not show that it was
accorded to him." There have been no other cases in the United States courts
involving allocution except the Austin-Bagley Corporation's appeal"1 3 when
it was convicted of conspiracy to violate the prohibition law. When the
corporation complained that it had not been hortatorily queried by the trial
court Judge Learned Hand aptly and appropriately translated the Federal
Code's harmless error section into the Latin maxim "The complaint .... is
indeed tabida in aufragio."
In this class then there are thirteen jurisdictions (twelve states and
the United States courts) which, in the absence of statutory requirement,
have held that the common law requires that a convicted defendant, before
he is sentenced, be asked if he has anything to say why sentence should not
be imposed upon him. There are two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and
Michigan, in which it may be the custom but probably is not required even
in capital cases. In Alabama and New Mexico the question is required in
all felony convictions, while the ten other jurisdictions require it in capital
cases only. In none of them is it required in the instance of a misdemeanor
and in the three states, Maryland, New Mexico and Pennsylvania, in which
the problem was presented, it was held not essential upon a plea of guilty
even in a capital case. But in none of the jurisdictions, unless the dictum
113. U. S. v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F. (2d) 229 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929), cert.
denied 279 U. S. 863, 49 Sup. Ct. 479, 73 L. ed. 1002 (1928).
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by the Supreme Court of the United States stands, is the omission of allocu-
tion grounds for a new trial, nor even for a remanding for resentence in
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina unless some meritorious
reason for doing so appears from the record and it is shown that the de-
fendant's rights have been impinged and he has been prejudiced by the
omission.
B. Jurisdictions Denying the Necessity of Allocution
The leading case supporting the view that failure to grant allocution is
not an error, in the absence of a statute requiring it, and that the practice
no longer serves any useful purpose and is therefore not compelled in any
case is State v. Hoyt.31 4 The appeal was from a trial and conviction of
murder and a sentence of death in which allocution had been omitted. The
court inquired into the rationale of the common law requirement and exam-
ined into whether the common law reasons for the rule then obtained in
Connecticut. The court noted that in any event the omission did not issue
out of the verdict and could not therefore constitute a ground or reason
for granting a new trial. Then the court fairly faced the issue: "But was the
omission referred to fatal to the validity of the sentence?" The common
law rule was recognized to be as stated by Chitty. It was observed, how-
ever, that anciently a defendant in a criminal case, even a felony charge,
was not allowed counsel, the theory being that the presiding judge and the
law adequately safeguarded the defendant's rights. The court then asked
what harm could be occasioned the prisoner by the omission of the cere-
mony under its practice. It was stated that there was no discretion as to
the punishment to be inflicted, there was and had been a year in which
to determine the prisoner's sanity and the opinion was expressed that had
counsel been present and made no request to be further heard and there
had been no objection to sentence without a further hearing such conduct
would have constituted a waiver of the formality. Attention was directed
to the fact that the prisoner could not have a pardon to plead as a
pardon came from the chief executive or the legislature after sentence.
There could be no attainder and there could be no benefit of clergy.
And finally, the court emphasized: "If he should say anything sug-
gesting ground for some relief, his saying it would not be the remedy; it
would have to take some other legal form and be filed within the time pre-
114. 47 Conn. 518, 543, 544, 546, 36 Am. Rep. 89, 97 (1880).
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scribed.' '1 4a (Italics added.) Therefore, the court thought "After all this
it would seem a most absurd, frivolous and idle ceremony for this court to
set aside the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court, to the
end that the accused may be asked 'whether he has anything to say,'" and
the judgment was affirmed.
In New Jersey's early cases it was decided that allocution was not neces-
sary in non-capital convictions, 15 though it was stated to be required under
the common law when the sentence of death was imposed. When the first
and only capital case' 16 involving the question came before the court forty
years later the court stated that the formula had always been employed in
capital cases but "Under the condition of affairs existing in this state, how-
ever, the reason for the form has entirely disappeared." The court adopted
the view that when one was represented by counsel and especially when he
moved for a new trial the interrogatory was unnecessary. The next case
before the court presented the novel question of whether allocution was re-
quired in a contempt proceeding." 7 The court fully reviewed the doctrine
of allocution and its own cases on the subject and concluded the ceremony
was no longer required. "Now, because a defendant no longer has to be
asked in any case whether he had anything to say why sentence should not
be pronounced against him, that does not mnean that he may not say any-
thing that would show the fact. He still has that right" (italics added), and
so New Jersey is placed in the category of jurisdictions no longer compelling
allocution, though concededly there could be some question about the classi-
fication and whether it is required in capital cases.
In Tennessee, Henry and Frazier"" were convicted of larceny and with-
out reference to the common law authorities and what has been most un-
usual on this subject, without the citation of a single authority, the court
summarily disposed of the matter thus: "As to the objection. ... we need
but say this is no ground for reversal in this court. The practice grew in
England out of the fact, that until within the present century the prisoner
defended himself, not being allowed the aid of counsel. It has been kept up
generally as a matter of form, but has nothing in it under our rule, which
114a. Id. at 544.
115. West v. State, 22 N. J.L. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1849); Dodge v. State, 24 N. J.
L. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1854).
116. Warner v. State, 56 N. J. L. 686, 695, 29 Al. 505, 508 (1894).
117. In the matter of Hayden, 101 N. J. Eq. 361, 366, 139 Adl. 328, 330 (Ch.
1927).
118. State v. Henry and Frazier, 65 Tenn. 539, 544 (1873).
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not only allows counsel, but imposing upon the court the duty of appointing
counsel, learned in the law, to defend in all cases where the party is unable
to employ such aid."
In its first case, 119 Wisconsin followed United States v. Ball and held
allocution necessary in a capital conviction. Its second case 120 was a habeas
corpus proceeding in which a defendant had plead guilty to murder in the
first degree and been sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite the fact that
it was not a capital case and despite the fact, as Judge Rosenberry said,
that the question was not strictly within the issues, the court called attention
to the fact that allocution had been omitted and, pointing to its former
opinion and the Pennsylvania case of Hamilton v. Commonwealth, said it
"is not a mere formality." There were other reasons for remanding the
cause and in discussing allocution the court did not consider that there had
been a plea of guilty. In Wisconsin's third case, 1 2 ' the appellant had been
convicted of failing to stop, give his name and give aid to one he had run
down with an automobile. When it was objected that allocution had been
omitted the court reexamined its previous cases and came to this conclusion:
"Upon mature reflection it seems utterly hopeless to attempt to state a rea-
son for regarding such a failure as prejudicial error .. .The practice has
obtained quite generally in this county, but it seems to have nothing more
to support it than its traditionary existence . . . It is time that the law be
rid of this technicality, which rests only in tradition and is barren of any
substantial benefit to the defendant."
The court then made this most interesting observation: "We do not
condemn the custom, which generally prevails with the trial judges of this
state. It is quite possible that in response to this question the trial court
often obtains information which is of aid in fixing a just and intelligent
sentence. But it is just as possible also that courts are often misled and
imposed upon by the crafty criminal who underftands the frailties not only
of human nature in general but the peculiar weaknesses of individual men
whose attitude toward life, their foibles and fancies are of more or less
concern to him who is about to be sentenced."
Consequently, there are four jurisdictions in which the conclusion has
been reached that the common law reasons for allocution no longer exist
119. French v. State, 85 Wis. 400, 55 N. W. 566 (1893).
120. Ex Parte Carlson, 176 Wis. 538, 186 N. W. 722 (1922).
121. Boehm v. State, 190 Wis. 609, 612-13, 209 N. W. 730 (1926).
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or apply and therefore the ceremony is not compelled in any case. There
have been no cases involving the matter in Massachusetts and Michigan
since 1866 and 1895, respectively, and it is probable those jurisdictions should
be placed in this category. There may be some doubt about Tennessee since
its only case was not a capital one but that was in 1873, and the question
has not been presented again. Possibly these four or six jurisdictions should
or could be placed in the class with the nine in which there has never been
a case nor a statute concerning allocution since it should no longer constitute
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